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Methodological behaviorism
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Methodological behaviorism is a rule about how psychology should be done: study behavior that others can observe, and leave private mental states out of the science. B. F. Skinner built his radical behaviorism in contrast to it.
Methodological behaviorism in 60 seconds
- It is a rule about method. It says psychology should study behavior and should not concern itself with mental states, because science needs things that more than one person can observe. [1][2]
- The name is about a century old. It seems to have first appeared in 1923. That same year, Karl Lashley gave it the first definition that others debated and built on. [3]
- Skinner drew a line against it in 1945. He said it splits the world into public and private events and keeps only the public ones. His radical behaviorism kept both. [3]
- Its meaning keeps shifting. Historians describe "considerable semantic confusion" around the term, and one radical behaviorist shows how a single phrase was read three different ways. [2][3]
- Thinkers still disagree about it. One author argues it sits closer to mentalism than to radical behaviorism. An encyclopedia classifies radical behaviorism as partly methodological. [1][2]
Jump to: What it is · Where the name came from · Watson's place · Skinner's line · The philosophers' version · Three readings · Side by side · Debates today · At home and school · Example · Myths · Words to know · Need a PDF? · More from DRAGEN · What remains unknown · Sources
What methodological behaviorism is
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy calls methodological behaviorism "a normative theory about the scientific conduct of psychology." [1] Normative means it tells scientists what they should do. It does not describe what people are like. It sets a rule for the people who study them.
The rule has two halves. Psychology should study the behavior of people and other animals. Psychology should not concern itself with mental states or events, such as beliefs and desires, or with building accounts of hidden information processing. [1] The reason given is that mental states are private. Science, in this view, needs things that are public, so private states do not make proper objects of study. [1]
Jay Moore, writing from the standpoint of a radical behaviorist, describes it the same way from another angle. He calls it "a prescriptive orientation to psychological science." [2] Its central claim, as he states it, is that the words in psychological theories "should be based on observable stimuli and behavior." [2] Most of Moore's article is about how that short phrase, "based on," has been read. We come back to that below.
Bruno Strapasson and Saulo de Freitas Araujo, who traced the term's history from 1923 to 1973, add an important detail. Across those fifty years, the term was defined by two central features: one a methodological assumption and the other a metaphysical one. [3] The methodological part is the rule about what science may study. The metaphysical part is a claim, or a refusal to make a claim, about what exists. Much of the confusion around the term comes from authors mixing these two parts in different ways. [3]
Put plainly, a methodological behaviorist can believe that thoughts and feelings are real and still say that psychology, as a science, should leave them aside. The rule is about method. It does not have to deny the inner life. Some writers took it that far, and some did not. [3]
Where the name came from
The term did not come from Watson. According to Strapasson and Araujo, the first use of "methodological behaviorism" to name a form of behaviorism seems to have appeared in 1923. [3] Abraham Roback, a psychologist who taught at Harvard, wrote a survey called Behaviorism and Psychology. He sorted behaviorism into four classes and 21 types. [3] He used the phrase "methodological behaviorism" for the work of Robert Yerkes, a comparative psychologist. [3]
Roback's point was that behaviorists varied. In his words, as quoted in the history, "there are behaviorists and behaviorists." [3] Later discussions of behaviorism did not take his classification into account. [3]
Karl Lashley, Watson's former student and friend, was the first to give the term a definition that others debated and developed, also in 1923. [3] Writing about how behaviorism should treat consciousness, Lashley saw "three distinct and incompatible formulations" of behaviorism. [3] As the history summarizes them:
- The first type accepts that consciousness exists and can be studied by looking inward, but treats those facts as irrelevant to behaviorism. Lashley linked this view to early objectivists such as Bechterew. [3]
- The second type holds that "facts of consciousness exist but are unsuited to any form of scientific treatment." [3] This is the type Lashley called methodological behaviorism. He linked it to Watson's early writings and to the psychologist Albert Weiss. [3]
- The third type is strict behaviorism, in which "Mind is behavior and nothing else." [3]
So from its first serious definition, methodological behaviorism meant something specific. It did not say that the mind is unreal. It said that whatever the mind is, science cannot handle it, so science should study behavior instead. [3]
Watson's place
John B. Watson's 1913 article "Psychology as the behaviorist views it" is often treated as the start of behaviorism. He called psychology "a purely objective experimental branch of natural science." [4] He wrote that "introspection forms no essential part of its methods." [4] And he wrote that the time had come when psychology "must discard all reference to consciousness." [4]
Lines like these are why the encyclopedia calls methodological behaviorism "a dominant theme in the writings of John Watson." [1] They read like the rule in its purest form: study what can be seen, drop what cannot.
Moore cautions against a simple reading. He writes that "Watson's (1913) position concerning this matter is more subtle and complex than often supposed." [2] Strapasson and Araujo show that behaviorists of the 1920s did not agree on whether behaviorism had to take a stand on the mind at all. One writer, Pepper, argued in 1923 that behaviorism was compatible with dualism, the view that mind and body are two different kinds of thing. [3] Lashley's strict behaviorism, by contrast, "makes no concessions to dualistic psychology." [3]
For a family or teacher, the lesson is simple. "Watson's behaviorism" and "methodological behaviorism" overlap, but they are not two names for one fixed idea. When someone uses either term, it is fair to ask what they mean by it.
Skinner's line in 1945
In 1945, Herbert Langfeld, then chief editor of Psychological Review, organized a symposium in which invited writers discussed how operationism applied to psychology. [3] Operationism is a position attributed to the Harvard physicist Percy Bridgman, who wrote that we mean by a concept "nothing more than a set of operations." [3] In psychology, the idea became influential and the subject of bitter debates. [3] Skinner contributed two papers. He welcomed an operational analysis of psychological words but pointed out its shortcomings. [3] The first of the two papers was the first time he used the term "radical behaviorism" in his writings. [3]
Skinner saw at least two ways of handling operationism in psychology, and so at least two kinds of behaviorism. [3] The first was methodological behaviorism. In his description, quoted in the history, it holds that "the world is divided into public and private events," and psychology keeps to the public ones to count as a science. [3] He attributed this position to the Harvard psychologists Edwin G. Boring and Stanley Stevens. [3]
The second was his own program, radical behaviorism. Skinner's key move was to separate two distinctions that many people blend together. Public versus private is one distinction. Physical versus mental is another. In his words, the first is "by no means the same as that between physical and mental." [3] His example was his own toothache, which he called "just as physical as my typewriter, though not public." [3] Only the person who has a toothache can feel it directly, but that does not make it a different kind of thing. Methodological behaviorism kept the line between public and private and stopped there. Radical behaviorism dropped the idea of a separate mental world and kept private events inside the science. [3]
Skinner also said why careful definitions matter so much in psychology: everyday speech about the mind carries "the vast vocabulary of ancient and non-scientific origin." [3] Both kinds of behaviorism wanted cleaner words. They disagreed about which words could be kept.
The philosophers' version
At the same time, a group of philosophers gave methodological behaviorism a very different meaning. Beginning in the 1930s, philosophers including Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel wrote about the philosophical problems of psychology. [3] They belonged to the movement called logical positivism. [2][3] In their view, the puzzles of psychology could be solved by a careful logical analysis of its language. [3]
The encyclopedia notes that methodological behaviorism "shares with analytical behaviorism the influence of positivism." [1] One aim of positivism was to unify psychology with the natural sciences. [1]
Herbert Feigl, a former member of the Vienna Circle, called for a "strictly ametaphysical" analysis of psychology's basic concepts. [3] That means an analysis that takes no stand at all on what ultimately exists. In Feigl's hands, methodological behaviorism stopped being something to avoid and became the solution for a scientific psychology. [3] His reasoning, as quoted in the history, was that psychology's statements must be "expressible in physical language" if they are to be checked by more than one person. [3]
Gustav Bergmann treated methodological behaviorism as the remedy for what he saw as a metaphysical kind of behaviorism. [3] For Skinner, in the historians' words, it was "an opportunistic and defective form of behaviorism." [3] The same label was a solution for one thinker and a mistake for another. Strapasson and Araujo sum it up: "Its value, it seems, was in the eye of the beholder." [3]
Three ways to read "based on"
Moore's 2013 article asks a practical question. If psychological words "should be based on observable stimuli and behavior," what does "based on" mean? [2] He suggests it has been read in at least three ways. [2]
Interpretation 1: stay silent. Psychologists should remain formally silent about unobservables, such as mental events, in their theories. [2] Moore notes that staying silent meant at least ignoring them, if not denying that they matter. A psychologist could even quietly keep the old idea of mental causes and simply not speak of it, and Moore says many did. [2] This was the original interpretation and was prominent in the first quarter of the 20th century. [2]
Interpretation 2: add inner variables. Psychologists should insert unobservable "organismic" variables between the stimulus and the response. [2] This produced the stimulus–organism–response, or S–O–R, model, associated with the psychologists Tolman and Woodworth. [2] The inner variables were said to cause or mediate behavior, which let psychologists explain things like variability and spontaneity. [2] Many psychologists of that time argued that the operational definition of each inner term should be "exhaustive," allowing only one meaning. [2]
Interpretation 3: add inner variables, defined only in part. Psychologists kept the inner variables but no longer had to define them completely. A partial definition was enough. [2] This reading arose in the 1940s, after logical positivism worked through a problem with defining theoretical terms. [2]
Moore argues that "Interpretation 3 has been adopted almost universally in traditional psychology." [2] On his account, observable behavior then serves as evidence for hidden mental causes, and the result is an "institutionalized mentalism." [2] He adds an irony: when cognitive psychology says it rejects behaviorism, what it rejects is a behaviorism built on Interpretations 1 and 2, which very few radical behaviorists hold. [2] In his view, modern cognitive psychology is consistent with Interpretation 3. [2]
Methodological and radical behaviorism side by side
The table follows Moore's comparison and the history of the term. Each row is a point where the two views part ways.
| Question | Methodological behaviorism | Radical behaviorism |
|---|---|---|
| What can science study? | Public events only. Private events are left out. [1][3] | Public and private events. A toothache or a silent thought is behavior too. [2][3] |
| Is "private" the same as "mental"? | The public–private line is treated as the line for science. [3] | No. Skinner called the two distinctions "by no means the same." [3] |
| How do words get their meaning? | Through reference and symbolism: observable terms stand for unobservable ones. [2] | Through use. "Meaning is to be found in an analysis of conditions of use." [2] |
| Are inner causes allowed? | Yes, in Interpretations 2 and 3, as variables that sit between stimulus and response. [2] | No appeal to mediating causes "from a nonbehavioral dimension." [2] |
| How is research done? | By formal testing of theories about those inner variables. [2] | By finding the variables that behavior changes with, and by replication. [2] |
Moore puts the research difference sharply: "Group statistical designs in which data are aggregated may only obscure, rather than reveal, order." [2] In his account, radical behaviorists ask what produces effective action "even for only one person," and they treat replication as the usual test of whether data are reliable. [2]
Debates today
Is methodological behaviorism closer to mentalism? Moore's conclusion is direct: "methodological behaviorism is actually closer to mentalism than to Skinner's radical behaviorism." [2] Mentalism, in his usage, means "explanations of behavior that appeal to causes from a nonbehavioral dimension." [2] His argument is that a science that leaves the mind out of its words, but keeps mental causes as hidden variables, is still a mentalist science underneath.
Or is radical behaviorism partly methodological? The encyclopedia sorts behaviorism into three types and says radical behaviorism "combines all three types of behaviorism." [1] On that view, radical behaviorism shares the methodological concern with behavior rather than internal processing. [1] One way to read the disagreement, offered here as DRAGEN's reading: Moore asks how each view explains behavior, while the encyclopedia asks what each view tells scientists to study. Either way, the label is hard to pin down.
What does the term even mean? Writers still use it in opposite ways. One writer quoted in the history calls the term "really a misnomer" for the plain use of scientific method. Another argues that it accepts the existence of the mind. [3] Strapasson and Araujo trace this confusion back to the start. Of the term's many meanings, they write: "It was there from the beginning." [3] Even so, they observe that "The concept still serves to demarcate what good behaviorism is or should be." [3] People keep using it to say what kind of behaviorist they are, and what kind they are not.
Is silence still influential? Moore notes that versions of Interpretation 1, which ignore all unobservables, "continue to be influential in some areas of psychology." [2] So the old rule is not only history.
What it means at home and school
Most parents and teachers never use the words "methodological behaviorism." But the rule shows up in daily work, sometimes helpfully and sometimes not.
The helpful part is a habit of describing what you can see and hear. "He hit the table twice" is something two people can check. "He was angry" is a guess about something inside. Writing down observable behavior lets a family, a teacher and a BCBA look at the same thing. DRAGEN's lessons on counting behavior and on checking that two observers agree teach that habit.
The unhelpful part is acting as if the inner life does not count. A strict reading of the rule would leave a child's fear, pain or worry outside the plan, simply because no one else can observe it. [1] Radical behaviorism does not do that. It "recognizes private behavioral events." [2] What a child says about how they feel is behavior too, and it carries information.
In DRAGEN's practice, the two fit together like this:
- Describe behavior in words that two people could check, and count it the same way each time.
- Listen to what the person says about their own thoughts, feelings and body. Write it down as what they said, in their words.
- Treat "no," a complaint, a question or a request to stop as information about what the person needs. It is not "noncompliance," and it is never a target to reduce.
- Keep immediate safety separate. If someone could get hurt, deal with safety first, then look at the pattern.
- Do not explain behavior with a label from inside ("lazy," "manipulative," "unmotivated"). Look at what happens before and after, and at the person's history.
- A BCBA reviews every clinical decision. This page is general information, not medical or clinical advice.
A made-up example
This example is invented. It does not describe a real person.
Learner C is 9. Most school days, he says "my stomach hurts" a few minutes before math. Then he puts his head down.
A strict methodological reading might say: the stomachache is private, so leave it out. Record only the head going down. Treat the words as a way to avoid math.
A radical behaviorist reading, the one DRAGEN works from, starts somewhere else:
- Health first. The family checks with Learner C's doctor. A real stomachache is a medical question before it is a behavior question. If he says it hurts now, an adult helps now.
- His words are information. The team writes down what he says, when he says it, and what happens next. They do not decide ahead of time that he is "faking."
- They look at the situation. The notes show the reports happen before timed math sheets, and not before math games. That is a clue about the task, not a verdict about the child.
- They ask him. Learner C says timed sheets make him feel "all twisty." The team believes him. A feeling he can name is a private event that matters. [2]
- They change the setting, not the child. The teacher tries untimed practice, shorter sheets and a way to ask for help. The team keeps counting how often he reports pain, so they can see whether the change helped.
- A BCBA reviews the data and the plan with the family and school.
Nothing in this plan ignores what Learner C feels, and nothing in it treats his report as a problem to stamp out.
Common myths
- "Methodological behaviorism is just Watson's behaviorism." The name came from others in 1923, and Watson's own view is "more subtle and complex than often supposed." [2][3]
- "Behaviorists say the mind does not exist." In Lashley's definition, methodological behaviorism said facts of consciousness exist but are unsuited to science. [3] Radical behaviorism treats thoughts and feelings as behavior. [2]
- "ABA is based on methodological behaviorism." Skinner developed his radical behaviorism against it, and Moore argues the two differ deeply. [2][3]
- "If you can't see it, it doesn't matter." Neither DRAGEN nor radical behaviorism holds that. Radical behaviorism "recognizes private behavioral events." [2]
- "The term has one clear meaning." Historians found "considerable semantic confusion" from the start. [3]
Words to know
- Methodological behaviorism: the rule that psychology should study behavior and leave mental states aside. [1][2]
- Radical behaviorism: Skinner's philosophy, which counts private events as behavior. [2][3]
- Private event: an event only one person can observe directly, such as Skinner's own example, a toothache. [3]
- Mentalism: explaining behavior by causes from a "nonbehavioral dimension." [2]
- Operationism: a position attributed to Percy Bridgman, that a concept means "nothing more than a set of operations." [3]
- Logical positivism: a philosophy, active from the 1930s, that tried to solve psychology's puzzles by a logical analysis of its language. [2][3]
- S–O–R: stimulus–organism–response, a model that places inner variables between what happens and what a person does. [2]
- Introspection: looking inward and reporting on one's own mind, which Watson rejected as a method. [4]
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Related DRAGENwiki pages: behaviorism · radical behaviorism · mentalism · explanatory fiction · operational definition · interobserver agreement · verbal behavior · empiricism · John B. Watson · B. F. Skinner · applied behavior analysis
What remains unknown
- Writers still do not agree on one definition of the term. [3]
- Whether radical behaviorism is partly methodological, as the encyclopedia classifies it, or deeply opposed to it, as Moore argues, depends on which question is being asked. [1][2]
- How the inner world fits into a behavioral account is, in the encyclopedia's words, "still incompletely charted territory." [1]
- This page summarizes the main lines. It does not settle the philosophy.
- Last checked on November 12, 2026.
Sources
- Graham, G. (2023). Behaviorism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (first published May 26, 2000; substantive revision January 13, 2023). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/
- Moore, J. (2013). Methodological behaviorism from the standpoint of a radical behaviorist. The Behavior Analyst, 36(2), 197–208. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392306 (full text: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5147434/)
- Strapasson, B. A., & de Freitas Araujo, S. (2020). Methodological behaviorism: Historical origins of a problematic concept (1923–1973). Perspectives on Behavior Science, 43(2), 415–429. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40614-020-00253-z (full text: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7316941/)
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20, 158–177. Classics in the History of Psychology, York University. https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/views.htm